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I. Introduction
The recent trade disputes between Canada and the United
States involving exports such as softwood lumber' and grain corn 2
have drawn attention to the unfair trade laws of the two countries.
The uncertainty, business harassment, and potential adverse eco-
nomic impact stemming from more than one hundred bilateral un-
fair trade law cases 3 over the last five years calls into question the
nature and administration of both systems. In light of such conflict
this Article compares and analyzes the statutory nature and adminis-
trative process of antidumping and countervailing duty laws in the
United States and Canada.
Partly due to concern over perceived business harassment, the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)4 contains new provisions
for the appeal of decisions rendered by the administrative agencies
of both countries in their determination of unfair trade laws. Chap-
ter nineteen of the FTA authorizes five-person binational panels to
make binding decisions upon appeal of final orders in countervailing
duty and antidumping cases. 5 The panels replace domestic judicial
review and will consider the administrative record of the case ap-
pealed using the standards of judicial review applicable under the
* Professor of International Business at the University of Toronto in Canada.
** Research Associate at the University of Toronto in Canada. Both authors would
like to thank Andrew Anderson for his contribution to this article.
I See, e.g., Certain Softwood Lumber Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Int'l Trade Ad-
min. 1986) (prelim. affirm. determination).
2 See, e.g., 121 Can. Gaz. III 555 (1987) (final determination that U.S. grain corn
benefited from subsidy).
3 See generally 1980-1988 U.S. INr'L TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. and 1980-1988 CAN.
IMPORT TRIBUNAL ANN. REP. Note that the Canadian Import Tribunal's functions have
been assumed by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
4 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement ofJan. 2, 1988 [hereinafter FTA], 27
I.L.M. 293 (1988), implemented in the United States by Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851
(1988) (effectiveJan. 1, 1989).
5 FTA, 27 I.L.M. at 386.
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law of the appropriate nation. 6
Certain provisions within Chapter nineteen create the possibility
that different decisions will be made in the new binational forum
than would have been made under the former system. Under the
FTA, five particular aspects of U.S. trade remedy law are subject to
binational panel review: U.S. statutes; legislative history; agency reg-
ulations; administrative practice; and judicial precedents relevant to
the case appealed. 7 This broad definition of unfair trade law, when
combined with other clauses in article 1904,8 provides the panels
with considerable discretion to establish their own rules of proce-
dure and jurisprudence, thereby permitting the panel to view the
case from a new perspective.
The replacement of domestic judicial review with binational
panel review and the opening up of the appeals procedure to the
binational panels has created controversy about the potential
changes that may occur in the administration of unfair trade law. 9 In
order to appreciate this controversy and contribute to a deeper un-
derstanding of the actual administrative and judicial processes in
each country it is necessary to consider the current nature of the
practice of unfair trade law in each nation.
II. The Administrative Process
Through their respective antidumping and countervailing duty
legislation Canada and the United States have sought to ensure that
domestic producers have full recourse to rights arising from the
Anti-Dumping Code,1 0 and the Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Code 1 signed in 1979 as a result of the Tokyo Round of multilateral
negotiations. Canada implemented the Tokyo Round codes through
6 Id. at 387.
7 Id. at 386-87.
8 Id. at 387-90.
9 For a detailed explanation and interpretation of the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms of the FTA, in light of legal and economic standards, see Anderson & Rugman, The
Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nisms, 13 J. WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 1, 43-59 (1989). For additional back-
ground material on the potential for controversy, and for relevant references, see Rugman
& Anderson, How to Make the Free Trade Agreement Work: Implementing the Dispute Settlement
Measures and Subsidies Code, I 1 TRADE MONITOR 1 (C.D. Howe Inst.) (1989). For an explana-
tion of Canadian thinking on the subject of U.S. procedures in the administration of unfair
trade law, see Rugman, A Canadian Perspective on U.S. Administered Protection and the Free Trade
Agreement, 40 MAINE L. REV. 305 (1988). For U.S. views, see Zuidwijk, Dispute Settlement
Mechanism Under the Free Trade Agreement, 40 MAINE L. REV. 325 (1988).
10 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, entered into force Jan. 1, 1980, reprinted in 26 GATT Basic Instruments and Se-
lected Documents Supp. 171 (1980) [hereinafter GATT BISD Supp.].
I I Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, entered into force Jan. 1, 1980, reprinted in 26
GATT BISD Supp. 56 (1980).
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the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA); 12 the United States did the
same through the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA).' 3 Both acts
create a mandatory, 14 two-track, 15 quasi-judicial administrative sys-
tem16  for resolving antidumping and countervailing duty
complaints. 17
The process for seeking antidumping or countervailing duty ac-
tion is similar in both Canada and the United States. Two key deter-
minations are required to support a finding of unfair trading
practices: (1) Are the foreign goods being dumped or subsidized?
and (2) Has the country's domestic industry producing similar prod-
ucts been materially injured?' 8 In both Canada and the United
States a governmental department determines the dumping and sub-
sidy issue, whereas an extradepartmental agency or tribunal deter-
mines the material injury question. 19 The similarity of the systems is
due to a common grounding in the GATT codes. 20
In the United States the determination of a subsidy or dumping
margin is handled by the International Trade Administration (ITA)
of the Department of Commerce (DOC). 2 1 The question of material
injury to domestic producers is handled by the International Trade
Commission (ITC).2 2 The ITC's six commissioners, who are ap-
pointed for a term of nine years, are nominated by the President and
approved by the U.S. Congress. 23 In Canada the determination of
dumping or subsidy is handled by the Assessment Programs Division
of the Department of National Revenue, Customs, and Excise (the
Department). 24 The newly formed Canadian International Trade
Tribunal (CITT) determines the presence of material injury.2 5 The
12 R.S.C. ch. S-15 (1985).
13 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.).
14 R.S.C. ch. S-15, §§ 31, 33, 42 (1985) and 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a (1988) (an
investigation shall be commenced whenever the administering authority determines that a
formal investigation is warranted).
15 See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
16 R.S.C. ch. S-15, §§ 63-77 (1985) and 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1988). See infra notes 21-26
and accompanying text.
17 In Canada the adoption of SIMA reflects a desire, in part, to ensure that all the
possible protectionist measures available to other nations are retained for use as bargain-
ing chips in future trade negotiations. See Can. House of Commons, Finance Standing
Comm. on Trade and Economic Affairs, 32d Part., 1st Sess. 28 (1981-82) (import policy).
18 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, amended by Trade Agreement
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 150 and SIMA, ch. 25, 1984 Can. Stat.
739, amended by ch. 14, 1985 Can. Stat. 165 and ch. 1, 1986 Can. Stat. 1.
19 See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
20 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1947) [hereinafter GATT].
21 See Antidumping Duties, 19 C.F.R. pt. 353 (1988); see also Countervailing Duties,
19 C.F.R. pt. 355 (1988).
22 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1988).
23 19 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
24 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 31(1) (1985).
25 It should be noted that the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, ch. 56,
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nine CITT members are appointed for their five year terms by the
Government through an order-in-council. 26
One interesting difference between the two systems is the com-
position of the tribunals hearing cases on the issue of material injury.
Although the CITT has appointed six of its nine members, a three-
member panel almost always decides the case and a deadlock is very
unusual. 27 On the other hand, ties are possible in the ITC because
the votes of all six of its permanent members are recorded.2 8 When
such a deadlock occurs the ITC determination is affirmative and fa-
vors the domestic plaintiff.29 Table 1 summarizes the steps taken in
the two countries from the filing of a complaint in an unfair trade
case to the imposition of definitive antidumping or countervailing
duties.
Table 1
Stages in Unfair Trade Law Investigations in the United States
and Canada
Decision Decision-maker
United States Canada
Initiation or Rejection of complaint ITA National
Revenue
Preliminary injury determination ITC National
Revenue
Preliminary determination on dumping or ITA National
subsidy Revenue
Final dumping or subsidy determination ITA National
Revenue
Final injury determination ITC CITT
1988 Can. Stat., reprinted in 11 Can. Gaz. II (No. 10) I (1988), united the functions of the
Canadian Import Tribunal (CIT), the Tariff Board, and the Textile Board. Id. at 22-26,
§§ 50-58. Although the newly-formed Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) is
more than just the sum of its parts, the procedure followed by the CITT in countervailing
duty and antidumping actions will probably remain unchanged.
26 Id. at 2, § 3.
27 The CITT did sit with four members in Countertop Microwave Ovens Originating
in or Exported from Japan, Singapore, and The Republic of Korea (R-6-88) (1988), but
the vote was unanimous and no difficulty arose. To the authors' knowledge, this is the
only case in which the CITT sat with an even number of members.
28 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330(d)(3), 2251(d) (1988).
29 See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d) (1988).
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III. Differences in Administrative Practices
4. The Departments of Commerce and National Revenue
1. Standing
To acquire standing in both Canada and the United States trade
complainants must represent a majority of producers of like goods in
that country. 30 The two countries have, however, handled this re-
quirement differently. In the United States the complainant enjoys a
presumption of standing.3' The DOC assumes that the complain-
ants represent a majority of producers and the respondent must re-
but this presumption.3 2 In Canada, the Department is much more
active in determining whether the complainant actually represents a
majority of producers of similar goods. In Canada and other rela-
tively small economies in which an industry may be comprised of one
or two companies it is common to find that the complainant repre-
sents a majority of producers. Thus, although the role of the agen-
cies in determining standing is different, the results are substantially
the same.
2. The Definition of Subsidy
The U.S. and Canadian definitions of subsidy are vague enough
to leave the administering authorities wide latitude to determine
what will be considered a countervailable subsidy. 33 In the United
States the issue is determined through the specificity test. Section
771(5)(B) of the TAA provides that a domestic subsidy is a benefit
"provided [by government action] to a specific enterprise or indus-
try, or group of enterprises or industries. ' '3 4 This section has been
read to stand for the proposition that generally available subsidies
will not be considered countervailed. 35 For example, the DOC has
considered subsidies to broadly based groups of industries such as
agriculture to be generally available and therefore not subject to a
countervailing duty.36 Generally available subsidies benefit a wide
30 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 42(1) (1985) and 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (1988).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1988).
32 See Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041, 10,043
(Dep't Comm. 1986) (final affirm, determination).
33 The Canadian Deputy Minister of Revenue in antidumping and countervailing
duty cases allows the binational panel review of "definitive decisions" concerning U.S.
goods. FTA, R.S.C. ch. C-2, § 77.11 (1988). Definitive decisions include final determina-
tions of dumping or subsidization, the definition of goods to which the final determination
applies, and the decision to renew or not to renew an undertaking. Id. § 77.1(1).
34 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(b) (1988).
35 See, e.g., Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
36 See Live Swine and Fresh Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada, 50 Fed.
Reg. 25,097 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final affirm, determination) (listing subsidies to agricul-
ture considered both generally available and targeted).
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range of industry groups within the political region offering the
subsidy.
The DOC has narrowly construed the principle of general avail-
ability for industries exporting to the United States. For example, in
Groundfish37 and in Softwood Lumber 38 the DOC indicated that it will
be increasingly difficult to convince U.S. authorities that a subsidy is
generally available and therefore should be considered
noncountervailable. 39 Another U.S. practice proving most unset-
tling to Canadian authorities is that the United States has defined as
countervailable certain federal government programs that are only
available in certain regions of Canada.40 Subjecting Canada's fed-
eral government programs to countervailing action could lead to
Canada's regional development programs being countervailed.
These programs are used by Canada in order to promote equity and
redistribution of income from rich regions to poorer ones.
Canadian treatment of the subsidy issue is also ambiguous. The
Department's final determination of Grain Corn41 is notable because
it included Appendix I which lists the criteria used to determine
whether a program confers a countervailed subsidy with respect to
grain corn. 4 2 The listed criteria are similar to those used by the
DOC: "whether the program provided a financial or other commer-
cial benefit ... and .. .whether the program was targeted."'4 3 The
appendix to Grain Corn also describes the Canadian view on generally
available versus targeted government programs. A generally avail-
able program is not countervailed whereas targeted programs are
countervailed. Criteria used to determine general availability
include:
[A]vailability to all persons in an industrial sector, e.g., agriculture;
availability to similar persons across a range of industrial sectors,
e.g., small business development; availability to more than one in-
dustrial sector; and general availability within the jurisdiction of the
granting authority. If a program is available only to certain enter-
prises or access to the program is limited, either by specifically in-
cluding or excluding certain enterprises, then the program may be
targeted depending on the eligibility conditions or criteria of the
program.4
4
37 Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,041 (Dep't
Comm. 1986) (final affirm, determination).
38 Certain Softwood Lumber Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (Int'l Trade Admin.
1986) (prelim. affirm, determination).
39 See Rugman & Porteous, The Softwood Lumber Decision of 1986: Broadening the Nature
of U.S. Administered Protection, 2 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 35, 47-48 (1988).
40 Id. at 55.
41 CAN. DEP'T NAT'L REVENUE, CUSTOMS, AND EXCISE, STATEMENT OF REASONS: FINAL
DETERMINATION OF SUBSIDIZING RESPECTING GRAIN CORN (1987) [hereinafter FINAL
DETERMINATION].
42 Id., app. 1, p. 1.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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Regarding Canada's regional development programs the De-
partment of National Revenue stated that "if a program is directed to
a certain region within the granting authorities jurisdiction because
that region possessed certain characteristics which are unique in the
jurisdiction, then the program may not be considered to be
targeted."'45 The Department applied this distinction in Grain Corn
and held that the Great Plains Conservation Program 46 was a
targeted regional program because other areas of the United States,
beyond the ten states targeted for assistance, could benefit from such
an anti-erosion program.47
Ideology has also been an influential factor in the U.S. subsidy
determination process. 48 The pattern of subsidy determinations by
the DOC has paralleled what is considered proper government prac-
tice in the United States.49 Government programs that tend to be
vindicated in countervailing duty cases include free government in-
formation services for exporters, loan guarantees from export-im-
port banks, price controls on natural resource inputs, wide-ranging
aid to agriculture, and certain tax depreciation schedules. 50 Not sur-
prisingly, these acceptable subsidies are also provided by the U.S.
government to its exporters.
Although Canada and the United States may differ on what con-
stitutes a countervailable subsidy, ultimately the subsidy definition of
the United States is of greater significance. Canadian companies
with market interests in the United States may forego a program of-
fered by the Canadian Government out of fear that it may leave them
vulnerable to a countervailing duty action from the United States. 51
On the other hand, due to the size difference of the two markets,
U.S. companies are very unlikely to react the same way to U.S. Gov-
ernment programs that may be considered subsidies by the Canadian
Government.5 2
The impact of the U.S. unfair trade legislation is clearly asym-
metrical. In 1986 more than $4 billion of Canadian exports to the
United States were affected by unfair trade laws, yet only $384 mil-
lion of U.S. exports to Canada were similarly affected. 53 The value
45 Id.
46 7 C.F.R. § 631 (1989).
47 FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 41, at app. 2, p. 1.
48 See Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV.
547, 556-70 (1987).
49 Id. at 569.
50 Id. at 567.
51 R. GREY, TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980's: AN AGENDA FOR CANADIAN-U.S. RELATIONS
66-67 (1981).
52 Id. at 98.
53 In preparation for the FTA negotiations, the TNO, Revenue Canada, and the De-
partment of Finance examined antidumping and countervailing duty actions taken by Can-
ada and the United States against one another from 1980 to mid-1987. Canada initiated
one countervailing duty action against the United States and eventually applied definitive
1990]
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of affected Canadian exports comprised 3.1% of Canada's merchan-
dise exports in 1986; only 0.12% of U.S. merchandise exports over
the same period were similarly affected.5 4
B. The Administrative Agencies: The ITC and CITT
1. Material Injury
Under the GATT system it is not sufficient for a domestic pro-
ducer simply to establish that certain imports are being dumped or
subsidized; the producer must also show material injury to the do-
mestic production of like goods as a result of the imports. 55 To show
material injury the Canadian producer or industry usually presents
evidence of loss of sales to dumped or subsidized goods, price com-
petition, and a decline in employment, market share and
profitability. 56
During the early stages of an investigation the Canadian process
differs from the U.S. procedure in that the Department of National
Revenue makes the initial determination of the existence of a reason-
able threat of material injury and decides whether a subsidy or dump-
ing has occurred. The Department's inquiry into material injury at
this stage is less formal and more perfunctory than the ITC's prelimi-
nary determination. Canada's less formal process at this stage has
been criticized because duties are levied following a preliminary de-
termination of unfair trade practices. 57 Recent legal developments
in the United States, however, have so constrained the ITC's ability
to find a lack of material injury that the practical difference between
duties. CAN. DEP'T FINANCE, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: AN ECONOMIC
ASSESSMENT 22 (1987). U.S. imports valued at $9 million (Canadian) were affected. Id.
The six countervailing duty cases resulting in action against Canadian exports to the
United States affected $4.172 billion (Canadian) of Canadian exports. Id. This huge fig-
ure is largely the result of the Softwood Lumber case of 1986 which resulted in the imposition
of an export tax by the Canadian government to avoid U.S. countervailing duties. Id.
In a paper using data from the period 1980 to 1985, Chong-Hyun Nam found only
0.9% of Canada's exports to the United States were under countervailing duties as com-
pared to 11.9% for Argentina and 7.5% for Korea during the same period. Nam, Export-
Promoting Subsidies, Countervailing Threats, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, I
WORLD'BANK ECON. REV. 727, 736 (1986). However, once softwood lumber is added to
1986 data the amount of Canadian trade to the United States subject to countervailing
duty rises to 4.6%.
54 U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, 68 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 516-17 (May 1988) and
STATISTICS CANADA, QUARTERLY ESTIMATES OF THE CANADIAN BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PAYMENTS (No. 67-001) (fourth quarter 1987).
55 See GATF, supra note 20, art. VI(5).
No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing duty
on the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting
party unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as
the case may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an estab-
lished domestic industry, or is such as to prevent or materially retard the
establishment of a domestic industry.
Id.
56 R. GREY, supra note 51, at 59.
57 Id. at 103.
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the two systems may be negligible. 58 Currently, the ITC will find a
reasonable indication of injury in all cases except where there is clear
and convincing evidence that no material injury, or threat thereof,
exists, and where there is no potential that evidence to the contrary
would arise if ITC pursued the case.59
Canadian firms may face a stricter standard for material injury at
the tribunal stage than their U.S. counterparts. 60 In assessing the
requisite causal link between the dumped or subsidized imports and
material injury the CITT has set a particularly onerous standard for
domestic producers to overcome. Factors such as declining markets,
lack of reputation, limited production ranges, and start up and pro-
duction difficulties have all been cited as the relevant cause of injury
where domestic producers claimed injury from dumped or subsi-
dized goods.6 1 In the United States the ITC has been criticized for
not analyzing causality in any meaningful way. 6 2 The causal analysis
of the ITC often consists only of simple data correlations.63 For ex-
ample, the ITC has found sufficient causality if imports are seen to
increase at the same time the industrial performance of the petition-
ing industry declines. 64
The presence of a growing pro-economics faction within the
ITC may lead to changes in the ITC's simplistic attitude towards cau-
sality. Commissioner Ronald Cass advocates the use of improved
economic analysis and seeks to define more accurately the causal link
between subsidy and injury.65 This can be done through analysis of
the actual size of the subsidies involved and elasticities of import
supply, domestic supply, and domestic demand. 66
58 Anderson & Rugman, supra note 9, at 8; see also R. CASS, ECONOMICS IN THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Ontario Centre for International Business
Working Paper No. 16, 1989).
59 See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
60 Herman, Injury Findings by the Canadian Import Tribunal The Decisive Elements, 1 REV.
INT'L BUS. L. 373, 395 (1987).
61 See CAN. ANTI-DUMPING TRIBUNAL: 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (citing Sporting Am-
munition (ADT-8-80) (1980)); see also CAN. IMPORT TRIBUNAL: 1984 ANNUAL REPORT 33
(citing Plywood Concrete Forming Panels (CIT-17-84) (1985)); CAN. ANTI-DUMPING TRI-
BUNAL: 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (citing Toilet Seats (ADT-5-83) (1983)); CAN. ANTI-
DUMPING TRIBUNAL: 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 27 (citing Chelating Agents (ADT-5-81)
(1981)).
62 Rugman and Anderson, commenting on the ITC's treatment of the causality issue
in their study of the Groundfish case, found that "at no point in the case was such a linkage
established." A. RUGMAN & A. ANDERSON, ADMINISTERED PROTECTION IN AMERICA 62
(1987).
63 A. SYKES, COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 15 (University
of Toronto Law and Economics Workshop Series No. 7, 1989).
64 Id.
65 R. CASS, supra note 58.
66 For an example of this analysis, see Live Swine and Pork from Canada, 7 I.T.R.D.
2285, 2293 (1985).
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2. Public Interest
One very unique provision of the Canadian enactment of the
FTA is section forty-five of SIMA, which introduces a consideration
of public interest into the unfair trade law process. 6 7 Neither the
European Community nor the United States have such a provision.
68
The public interest component of SIMA stemmed from complaints
that its predecessor, the Anti-Dumping Act, was overly concerned
with domestic producer interests and ignored the effect of duties on
downstream users of the goods and consumers.
6 9
If the CITT decides it is appropriate, the Tribunal has the au-
thority under section forty-five to examine the impact on the public
interest of its finding of material injury and the subsequent assess-
ment of duties. 70 The CITT must submit a report to the Minister of
Finance if it determines that collection of such duties would not be in
the public interest. 7 1 The Minister then has discretion to lower or to
67 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 45 (1985).
68 Other jurisdictions have attempted to deal with the public interest issue. The EEC
antidumping and subsidization code requires authorities to assess that in the event the
"interests of the Community call for Community intervention, a definitive anti-dumping or
countervailing duty shall be imposed by the Council, acting by qualified majority on a
proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation." 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L
339) art. 12(1), at 10 (1979) (Council regulation to protect against dumped or subsidized
imports from non-EEC members). The Commission recommendation, however, implies
that the larger interests of the Community must be taken into account since its recommen-
dation on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members
of the European Coal and Steel Community states that "[if] interests of the Community
call for Community intervention; the Commission, after consultation, shall recommend that a
definitive anti-dumping or countervailing duty be imposed." 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
339) art. 12(1), at 24 (1979) (emphasis added) (Commission recommendation).
69 Anti-Dumping Act, ch. 10, 1968-69 Can. Stat. 75, repealed by SIMA, ch. 25, 1984
Can. Stat. 739, § 110. See Can. House of Commons, Finance Standing Comm. on Trade
and Economic Affairs, 32d Pan., 1st Sess. 23 (1981-82) (import policy). For Canadian
treatment of public interest, see SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 45(1) (1985), which provides:
Where, as a result of an inquiry referred to in section 42 arising out of
the dumping or subsidizing of any goods, the Tribunal makes an order or
finding described in any of sections 3 to 6 with respect to those goods and
the Tribunal is of the opinion that the imposition of an anti-dumping or
countervailing duty, or the imposition of such a duty in the full amount pro-
vided for by any of those sections, in respect of the goods would not or might
not be in the public interest, the Tribunal shall, forthwith after making the
order or finding,
(a) report to the Minister of Finance that it is of that opinion and provide
him with a statement of the facts and reasons that caused it to be of that
opinion; and
(b) cause a copy of the report to be published in the Canada Gazette.
Id.
70 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 45(l) (1985).
71 A report is presented to the Minister of Finance by the Tribunal. Financial Admin-
istration Act, R.S.C. ch. F-10, § 17 (1985). However, "should the Tribunal determine that,
on balance, the public interest, encompassing non-producer private interests, is not being
served by the imposition of the full or partial amount of an anti-dumping or countervailing
duty, [then] section 45 requires the Tribunal to so report to the Minister." CAN. IMPORT
TRIBUNAL: REPORT ON PUBLIC INTEREST GRAIN CORN 3 (Oct. 20, 1987) [hereinafter RE-
PORT ON GRAIN CORN].
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eliminate the duty.7 2
Section forty-five imposes two responsibilities on the Tribunal.
First, the Tribunal must determine the nature and extent of the im-
pact on interested parties of the countervailing or antidumping
duty.73 This parallels the scope of the Tribunal's past duties. The
CITT here is merely required to advise the Minister whether con-
sumers' and users' claims of injury are valid. Second, the Tribunal
must advise the Minister as to the level of duty best serving the pub-
lic interest. 74 This requirement presents the Tribunal with new re-
sponsibilities. 75 To meet these new responsibilities the Tribunal has
indicated that it may employ tests based upon cost-benefit methodol-
ogies. 76 To this end the Tribunal would be prepared to examine
72 A weakness of § 45 is that the CITT is not required to consider the public interest
in each case. The Canadian legislators saw difficulty in straying too far from the criteria set
out in the GAIT codes. This was clear when the legislators failed to recommend that
SIMA include a consideration of consumer interests in the Tribunal's criteria.
First, it is important that the Tribunal, in deciding whether injury is pres-
ent, be guided exclusively by the criteria set out in the GATT Codes. If the
Tribunal was guided by criteria other than those set out in the GATT, then
Canadian industry would not receive the same level of protection against un-
fair trade practices as comparable industries in other countries. The inquiry
into producer injury is too important to introduce any other consideration
which may inadvertently interfere with this decision.
As the Tribunal must render its decisions within strict time limits, any
additional criteria reflecting consumer interest could lengthen the time re-
quired for an inquiry. A lengthening of the time required for an inquiry (or a
hastily prepared decision) could deny legitimate protection to an industry
suffering injury from dumped imports.
Can. House of Commons, Finance Standing Comm. on Trade and Economic Affairs, 32d
Parl., 1st Sess. 28 (1981-82) (import policy).
73 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 45(2) (1985) states:
Where any person interested in an inquiry referred to in subsection (1)
makes a request to the Tribunal for an opportunity to make representations
to the Tribunal should, if it makes an order described in any of sections 3 to
6 with respect to any goods in respect of which the inquiry is being made,
make a report pursuant to paragraph (l)(a) with respect to those goods, the
Tribunal shall afford such person an opportunity to make representations to
the Tribunal on that question orally or in writing, or both, as the Tribunal
directs in the case of that inquiry.
Id.
74 Id. § 45(1).
75 The Tribunal stated in Grain Corn that in the future, broader arguments of the
public interest may be placed before them. It indicated that in future public interest in-
quiries it would also be open to arguments concerning the possible effect of the counter-
vailing duty on other Canadian exports due to retaliation by the foreign government
affected.
The Director of Investigations and Research under the Competition Act
might seek leave to appear before the Tribunal in order to present evidence
to the effect that a full imposition of the countervailing duty would, because
of certain structural or behavioral features of the cosmetic product market,
or its downstream markets, result in a serious reduction of competition and,
possibly efficiency, to the detriment of various classes of producers and
consumers.
REPORT ON GRAIN CORN, supra note 71, at 5.
76 Id. at 4-5.
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evidence regarding the economic variables relevant to the case, such
as prices, income, and costs.
Section forty-five was originally viewed as a safeguard for Cana-
dian consumers and intermediate producers. 7" It was an attempt to
offset the significant producer bias of SIMA through an examination
of the impact on the public interest of countervailing and antidump-
ing duties. In practice, however, this attempt seems to have failed.
Countervailing and antidumping duties are seen by many economists
as contrary to the public interest because the costs incurred by soci-
ety at large far outweigh the benefits to domestic producers. 78 In
addition, there have been only three public interest hearings in the
four years that section forty-five has been in existence. 79 In only one
of these cases, Grain Corn, was a report made to the Minister.8" Grain
Corn may represent a turning point in the use of section forty-five
because the ultimate result in the case was an immediate reduction in
the countervailing duty on U.S. corn imports.8 '
Grain Corn demonstrates that the CITT will attempt to limit the
use of section forty-five to exceptional circumstances. Given the
success of the Grain Corn hearing this may prove difficult. Grain Corn
was exceptional only to the extent that consumers, intermediate pro-
ducers, and users organized to fight the countervailing duty.,8 2 The
result in Grain Corn will probably encourage future requests for pub-
lic interest hearings.
If public interest hearings do become more common, Grain Corn
indicates that the CIFT will attempt first to determine whether the
countervailing or antidumping duty assessed by the Tribunal is capa-
ble of being fully captured by the domestic producers. Second, if the
full amount of the duty cannot be captured, the CITT will determine
the level of duty that can be captured. Third, the CITT will deter-
mine whether this reduced level of duty is "unduly burdensome" to
77 A. RUGMAN & A. ANDERSON, supra note 62, ch. 3.
78 For an overview of § 45, see K. STEGEMANN, REPORT OF THE POLICY FORUM OF SPE-
CIAL IMPORT MEASURES LEGISLATION (John Deutch Institute for the Study of Economic
Policy Forum Series No. 4, 1984). For an analysis of the strategic responses of firms to
unfair trade laws, see Porteous & Rugman, Canadian Unfair Trade Laws and Corporate Strategy,
3 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 237 (1989).
79 Fresh Whole Onions, Originating in or Exported from the United States (CIT-I-
87) (1987); Grain Corn (CIT-7-86) (1986); and Surgical Adhesive Tapes and Plasters, Ex-
cluding Plastic Tapes and Plasters, Originating in or Exported from Japan (CIT-8-85)
(1985).
80 REPORT ON GRAIN CORN, supra note 73, at 11.
81 According to confidential conversations with various Finance Department officials
the slightly higher duty announced by the Minister of State for Finance resulted from a
difference in views between the International Economic Relations Division and the studies
reviewed by the CIT.
82 Grain Corn was atypical in that it was both a subsidy case and an agriculture case. It
involved special considerations about possible strain on the treasury. However, it is un-
likely that future cases will be distinguished from Grain Corn on the basis of these atypical
characteristics.
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consumers and users of the affected good. The CITr hopes, in the
public interest hearing, to advise the Minister on a reduction of duty
without having to determine how the burden of "unfair trading"
should be borne. Public interest hearings provide domestic produ-
cers with the benefits of government protection and consumers with
the benefits of reduced uncertainty with regard to price.
This approach, however, is troublesome. Using economic tests
of cost-benefit analysis, the Tribunal will have to decide how injury
and net benefits should be distributed between domestic interests. If
such adjudications become common the Tribunal will face a chal-
lenging decision involving normative and ethical factors in order to
determine the optimal distribution of the unfair trade burden. s
C. The Use of "Undertakings" to Avoid the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Process
Exporters facing unfair trade actions may enter an undertaking,
that is, they may negotiate an agreement with the complaining coun-
try rather than face antidumping and countervailing duties. 84 This
apparently brings an element of flexibility to the world's unfair trade
law regimes, but there are a number of obstacles in the United States
and Canada limiting the use of undertakings.
One tactical hurdle is that exporters to Canada faced with an
antidumping action must decide prior to a preliminary determina-
tion by the Department whether or not to submit an undertaking. 85
This explains why there is a certain lack of appeal in Canada for the
undertakings option. Another factor discouraging undertakings in
Canada is that an exporter accounting for less than a majority of a
category of goods must cooperate with other exporters to submit an
undertaking.8 6 Currently there are only ten undertakings in force in
Canada. 87
Before Canada will allow an undertaking to replace an an-
tidumping or countervailing duty case, the producers seeking the un-
dertaking must account for nearly all exports to Canada of the
dumped or subsidized goods and completely eliminate either the
83 The social costs and benefits of a duty cannot be evaluated in any precise or mean-
ingful fashion since the technique of cost-benefit analysis, being derived from the theoreti-
cal welfare of general equilibrium systems, does not lend itself readily to the measurement
of intangible political goals such as the "public interest." A. RUGMAN, MULTINATIONALS IN
CANADA: THEORY, PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 37 (1980).
84 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, § 2(1) (1985); see also id. § 49 (explanation of the use of
undertakings).
85 Id. § 49(2)(b).
86 Id. § 2(1).
87 Price Undertakings in force as of May 24, 1989, are as follows:
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dumping or the injury to Canadian production.88 Before accepting
an undertaking the Department of National Revenue consults with
importers and Canadian producers. 89 Once an undertaking is ac-
cepted by the Deputy Minister, the antidumping or countervailing
duty investigation is suspended and no duties are collected while the
undertaking is in force.90
In the United States the Tariff Act of 19309t authorizes under-
takings offered by a government or a group of exporters to terminate
antidumping and countervailing duty actions. 92 Exporters dealing
with the U.S. system are not confronted with the draconian timing
requirement of the Canadian undertaking system. "Suspension
agreements," the U.S. term for undertakings, can be negotiated at
any time up to thirty days before the final decision. 93 Despite this
favorable aspect of the U.S. system, undertakings are not used pro-
portionately more often than in the Canadian system. One reason
for this is that section 734 narrowly limits the use of undertakings by
requiring that "imports make up at least eighty-five percent of the
imports subject to investigation. ' 94 Currently there are twenty-two
suspension agreements in force under U.S. law.95
GATT figures indicate that undertakings are a common resolu-
Country Commodity
Brazil Carbon Steel Pipe
F.R.G. Porcelain Insulators
G.D.R. Carbon Steel Plate
Japan Oil and Gas Well Casting
Luxembourg Carbon Steel Pipe
U.S. Frozen Pies and Prepared Dinners
U.S. Metal Storage Cabinets
U.S. Tile Backer Board
U.S. Grinding Balls
Yugoslavia Carbon Steel Pipe
List supplied by Can. Dep't of Nat'l Revenue, Customs, and Excise upon request.
88 SIMA, R.S.C. ch. S-15, §§ 2(1), 49 (1985).
89 Id. § 49.
90 Id. § 50(a). For an interesting view on undertakings and other voluntary export
restraints, see generally D. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECTIONISM, STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (expressing the notion that undertakings should be seen as
opportunities rather than admissions of guilt). According to Yoffie, the key to success for
the exporter in undertakings is to negotiate for loopholes; "the optimal agreement for an
exporting state to seek is one that is impermeable and restrictive in form (thus satisfying
potential political problems) but porous and unrestrictive in substance-an agreement so
filled with loopholes that it is impossible to implement." Id. at 27. Yoffie has found this to
be a successful strategy for small third world countries when dealing with protectionist
actions from the United States. Id.
91 Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (as codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1677k).
92 19 U.S.C. § 1673c (1988).
93 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(e)(l) (1988).
94 S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979).
95 U.S. Dep't Commerce, Import Admin. Countervailing Duty and Antidumping
Compliance List (Nov. 1, 1989) (on file in the offices of N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.) (there
are 16 countervailing duty cases and 6 antidumping cases).
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tion to unfair trade cases in all countries except the United States
and Canada.9 6 This can be explained by the DOC's and National
Revenue's belief that suspension agreements are exceedingly diffi-
cult to monitor. Thus, they are to be avoided.9 7
IV. Data on Use of Unfair Trade Laws in Canada and the United
States
Having examined the procedures of the U.S. and Canadian sys-
tems it is now useful to analyze their results. Tables 2 and 3 summa-
rize all antidumping and countervailing duty actions reported to the
GATT for the period 1985 to 1987. These tables place the unfair
trade law practices of the United States and Canada in both a bilat-
eral and a global perspective.
A. Antidumping
Table 2 indicates that enthusiasm for antidumping actions in
Canada, as measured by the imposition of definitive duties, was sec-
ond only to that of the United States in the period from 1985 to
1987. Canada is either second or third to the United States in the
categories of initiations, provisional duties, and definitive duties.
The United States leads all other GATT countries with the greatest
number of actions in these categories. 98 Canada imposed approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of all definitive antidumping duties im-
posed by GATT members in the period between 1985 and 1987. 99
Impositions by the United States accounted for approximately fifty
percent of all such actions.100 Given the larger size of the U.S. econ-
omy it is safe to say that it is much more likely that any particular
Canadian company will resort to antidumping actions than a U.S.
company.101 From 1985 to 1987, the European Community and the
United States accounted for fifty-eight percent of definitive duty im-
positions, whereas Canada and Australia accounted for another
96 For example, 100% of the antidumping actions initiated in Finland and Sweden
over the period July 1, 1985, to June 30, 1987, resulted in undertakings. Over the same
period, over 55% of EC antidumping cases were initiated this way. See 34 GATT BISD
Supp. 1, 201-03 (1987) (referring to chart summarizing antidumping actions between July
1, 1985, and June 30, 1987); see also Nam, supra note 53, at 732 (citing the proposition that
the EC has relied heavily on undertakings to deal with subsidized imports).
97 The congressional view of undertakings was expressed clearly in a Senate Report:
"suspension is an unusual action which should not become the normal means for dispos-
ing of cases." S. REP. No. 96-249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979). The Senate Report
describes an onerous list of conditions as compared to Canada that have to be met before
an undertaking will be considered acceptable. Id.
98 34 GATT BISD Supp. at 201-03.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 The Canadian affinity for dumping legislation may be seen as part of its heritage.
In 1903 Canada was the first country unilaterally to legislate against dumping. See J.JACK-
SON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 551 (1977).
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forty-two percent of those actions. 10 2
Table Two
Summary of Anti-Dumping Actions July 1, 1985 - June 30, 1987
(Percent)'0 3
PROVISIONAL DEFINITIVE PRICE
COUNTRY INITIATION MEASURES DUTIES UNDERTAKINGS'
AUSTRALIA 94 (31.3) 49 (23.9) 23 (17.3) 6 (14.3)
CANADA 51(17.0) 35 (17.07) 33 (24.8) 4 (9.5)
E.C.2 40 (13.33) 18 (8.8) 14 (10.5) 22 (52.4)
FINLAND 5 (1.6) 3 (1.5) 0 (0.0) 4 (9.5)
KOREA 4 (1.4) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.8)
SWEDEN 2 (0.67) 2 (0.98) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.8)
U.S. 104 (34.7) 98 (47.8) 63 (47.4) 2 (4.8)
TOTAL 3  300 (100) 205 (100) 133 (100) 42 (100)
In the U.S. these are called "Suspension Agreements."
2 GATT documents state these are actions taken with respect to the Parties only.
Due to rounding, percentages may not total exactly 100.
It is understandable that two relatively small economies such as
Australia and Canada would account for a large proportion of an-
tidumping actions given the fact that they are often targeted for the
excess output of larger producers in the triad (United States, Japan,
and the European Community) and low-cost producers in Korea,
Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In such cases Canadian manufacturers or
manufacturers in other small industrial countries are likely to be
much more affected by imports than are producers in the United
States, Japan, or even in the European Community.
B. Countervailing Duties
Table 3 reveals the isolation of the United States in its use of
countervailing duty laws. It also shows that the availability of similar
institutions and processes does not always result in similar use or
results. The United States imposed ninety-two percent of all defini-
tive countervailing duties in the period between 1985 and 1987. The
United States also accounted for seventy percent of all counter-
vailing duty initiatives and seventy-six percent of all provisional
countervailing duties imposed.10 4 In contrast, Canada imposed only
eight percent of all definitive countervailing duties. 10 5 Canada and
the United States were the only two countries to impose definitive
102 34 GATF BISD Supp. at 201-03.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 191-92.
105 Id.
CANADA-U.S. TRADE
countervailing duties during this period.' 0 6 This is especially signifi-
cant given the intrusive nature of a countervailing duty action. In
countervailing duty actions policy decisions made by sovereign na-
tions are evaluated and sanctioned by the imposition of definitive du-
ties. 10 7 United States policy decisions have been relatively immune
from similar scrutiny by other nations, but this may not long remain
the case. In the 1987 Grain Corn decision, Canada found that a U.S.
irrigation program provided a countervailed subsidy and levied
countervailing duties. This was the first time a U.S. export was as-
sessed with countervailing duties.10 8
Table Three
Summary of Countervailing Duty Actions July 1, 1985 - June 30,
1987 (Percent) '09
PROVISIONAL DEFINITIVE PRICE
COUNTRY INITIATION MEASURES DUTIES UNDER-
TAKINGS'
AUSTRALIA 6 (7.8) 8 (15.1) 0 (0.0) 6 (60.0)
CANADA 5 (6.5) 4 (7.5) 3 (8.3) 1 (10.0)
CHILE 11 (14.3) 1 (1.9) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
NEW ZEALAND 1 (1.3) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
U.S. 54 (70.1) 40 (75.5) 33 (92.0) 3 (30.0)
TOTAL2  77 (100) 53 (100) 36 (100) 10 (100)
' In the U.S. these are called "Suspension Agreements."
2 Due to rounding, percentages may not total exactly 100.
V. Conclusions
Though the U.S. and Canadian unfair trade laws are both rooted
in GATT, their administration results in procedural biases favoring
the domestic producer. Although there are notable, differences in
such areas as standing, subsidy definition, analysis of material injury,
and the integration of public interest considerations into the process,
the two systems of unfair trade law are essentially similar in struc-
ture. This is particularly true with regard to the "undertaking" prac-
tices of both countries which, while similar to each other, are in
106 Id.
107 In many ways the U.S. application of its countervailing duty laws parallels its atti-
tude toward the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and has led to similar reactions of
offense by affected parties. See Porteous & Verbeke, The Implementation of Strategic Export
Controls in Canada, 15 CAN. PUB. POLY 12, 20 (1989). For discussions of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law and reactions to it, see Marcus, Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The President's
Authority to Impose Extraterritorial Controls, 15 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1163, 1163-67 (1983).
108 34 GATT BISD Supp. at 191.
109 Id. at 191-92, 201-03.
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contrast to the practices of other GATT members, namely the Euro-
pean Community."I0 While the procedures and definitions of one
system seem no worse than the other, they differ significantly in prac-
tice. Canada seems as eager as the United States to use the an-
tidumping mechanism, but the United States marches alone when it
comes to its extensive use of the much more intrusive countervailing
duty law. ' ' I
Canada's greater concern about potential misuse of the adminis-
trative process by the United States reflects the larger economic im-
pact of U.S. unfair trade law on Canadian business. Canada insisted
that the appeals mechanisms of the FTA be added to address this
concern."12 Now the binational panels face the challenge of making
binding decisions based on the administrative record of each case. It
is apparent that some asymmetry will exist in the conduct of the bina-
tional panels.' 13 The U.S. standard of administrative review is much
broader than that in Canada. For example, Canada's Department of
National Revenue has rarely filed detailed reasons for a ruling. In
contrast the Department of Commerce makes available to the public
all of its rulings and its reasoning in reaching these rulings. This may
begin to change, but it is clear that, on average, the binational panels
will probably give less deference now than in the past to the adminis-
trative agencies in the United States when they review Canadian
cases. Because countervailing duty actions are major bilateral irri-
tants the net outcome should be greater discipline in the administra-
tion of this aspect of U.S. trade law. This should result in an overall
improvement in bilateral economic relations.
11O Id.
Ill Id.
112 See generally Rugman & Anderson, Business Concerns About Implementing the Free Trade
Agreement, 53 Bus. Q. (No. 4) (1989).
1 13 See supra note 9. In the context of the FTA, the potential review of National Reve-
nue's decision is reportedly due to Canada's success in bringing the U.S. Department of
Commerce's decisions under binational review. It will be interesting to see what will come
of broadening the grounds of appeal for Revenue Canada's decisions. Prior to the FTA,
none of the trade decisions by the Deputy Minister were appealable. John Coleman,
Chairman of the CIT', stated in a recent speech that "[tihere is a clear possibility bina-
tional panels will overturn from time to time Revenue Canada's decisions on questions
such as the definition of subsidy or the margins of subsidizing or dumping." Coleman, New
Rules, New Institutions: The CITT 14 (paper prepared for the University of Ottawa/Carleton
University conference "Living With Free Trade," May 5, 1989). Hopefully, this new ex-
panded form of review will exert greater discipline on the Department of Commerce and
Revenue Canada, thus improving the quality of the decisions made by both countries.
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